

INFLATION EXPECTATIONS – A POLICY TOOL?

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WHY INFLATION EXPECTATIONS?

Key variable for economic decisions: perceived real interest rate

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Mario Draghi (2015): “*When inflation expectations go up with zero nominal rates, real rates go down. When real rates go down, investments and the economic activity improves. That’s the reasoning [of QE].*”

STANDARD MECHANISMS

- *Households consume more*: when inflation expectations rise and nominal interest rates are unchanged (ZLB), real interest rates are lower, so households should save less and spend more.
- *Firms invest more and hire more workers*: when inflation expectations rise and nominal interest rates are unchanged (ZLB), real interest rates are lower so user cost of capital and labor are lower, inducing firms to raise their capital and employment.
- *Firms raise their prices*: with sticky prices, inflation lowers firms' relative price over time, so expectation of higher inflation induces them to raise prices more than they would otherwise.
- *Workers raise their wage demands*: with sticky wages, inflation lowers the real wage over time, so expectations of higher inflation induce workers to raise wage demands, which should raise prices further.

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 - Yes. They update their consumption/employment/pricing/etc. (but mechanisms remain unclear)


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
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 - Measurement of inflation expectations (especially firms)
 - Breaking through the veil of inattention


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Expectations are not interchangeable across agents

WHAT FORCES INFLUENCE INFLATION EXPECTATIONS?

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Predictors of inflation expectations


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
Predictors of inflation expectations

- Perceptions/experience of inflation (**strong**)
- Shopping (**strong**)
- Media (**intermediate**)
- Policy (**weak**)

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 - Upshot:
 - Households and firms appear to be Bayesian learners
 - Strength of priors
 - Strength of signals
- } Posterior beliefs
- Information effects are short-lived (less than 6 months)

CAN WE MANIPULATE INFLATION EXPECTATIONS?

Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2018)

Dep. var.: Revision of one-year-ahead inflation forecasts of U.S. consumers

Treatment groups (coefficients are relative to control)

Past inflation	-1.954*** (0.366)
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FOMC inflation forecast	-2.004*** (0.384)

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
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 - ... but need more research on mechanisms and general equilibrium effects

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 - Example: Business Inflation Expectations (BIE; FRB Atlanta)

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
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- Surveys of firms’ inflation expectations are expensive but they are most useful!
- Good surveys: Ukraine and Uruguay

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- **Breaking through the veil of inattention**


BREAKING THROUGH THE VEIL OF INATTENTION

Perceived inflation target in the U.S.




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January 2012: Fed announces 2% IT



BREAKING THROUGH THE VEIL OF INATTENTION

Employment outlook; ECB announces QE tapering



Source: Deloitte Survey of Chief Financial Officers

BREAKING THROUGH THE VEIL OF INATTENTION

- Communication can work
 - Public campaigns for other policies (healthcare, fiscal) work
 - Information treatment moves expectations

BREAKING THROUGH THE VEIL OF INATTENTION

- Communication can work
- Simple messages are better
 - simple messages/facts are as effective as complex policy statements

Dep. var.: Revision of one-year-ahead inflation forecasts of U.S. consumers

Treatment groups (coefficients are relative to control)

FOMC inflation forecast	-2.004*** (0.384)
FOMC statement	-2.272*** (0.335)

BREAKING THROUGH THE VEIL OF INATTENTION

- Communication can work
- Simple messages are better
- Repeat the message
 - One-time announcements do not have long-lasting effects on expectations of firms and households (information “depreciates” within months)
 - Need information campaigns

BREAKING THROUGH THE VEIL OF INATTENTION

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- Simple messages are better
- Repeat the message
- Take the message directly to the target audience
 - Conventional media may be not good enough

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 - But one can have different messages for “North” to slow down and for “South” to accelerate.

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 - Potentially differentiate messages across audiences
- Target the message to the scenario
 - For example, if inflation is too low, emphasize the inflation target (rather than actual inflation) to raise inflation expectations

CONCLUDING REMARKS

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 - Move consumption/employment/investment
 - Directly influence prices
 - Target specific areas, industries, or types of consumers
- Are we ready to use it? Not yet...
 - More research to study how inflation expectations translate into actions
 - More high-quality surveys of firms' inflation expectations
 - New communication strategies to reach consumers and firms