

Managing Monetary Policy Normalization

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- ▶ NK models with ZLB and unconventional policies
 - ▶ forward guidance, spending multipliers, taxes...
 - ▶ this paper: liquidity and reserve management
- ▶ Two interest rates:

$$\frac{U_{ct}}{U_{ct+1}} \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} = \beta (1 + i^B), \quad i^B - i^R \geq 0$$

- ▶ $R \uparrow \implies i^B \downarrow$, even if $i^R = 0$
 - ▶ comes at the cost of distortionary taxation

Roadmap

- ▶ Nice positive model of reserve management
 - ▶ review the argument
- ▶ Normative implications
 - ▶ which tax instruments?
 - ▶ CB asset portfolio → costs and benefits of issuing liquidity?
 - ▶ ZLB vs credit supply

Assets and returns

Private banks	
Assets	Liabilities
Reserves	Deposits
Private bonds	Equity

Government	
Assets	Liabilities
Tax revenues	Reserves
Seignorage	Gov't bonds

- ▶ Utility benefit from holding liquid assets \rightarrow spread $i^B \geq i^D$
- ▶ Deposits backed by reserves ($D \leq \rho R$) \rightarrow spread $i^D \geq i^R$

Two ways of creating liquidity

- ▶ Change composition of government liabilities
 - ▶ issue reserves to purchase T-bills
 - ▶ consumers shift from holding T-bills to holding deposits
 - ▶ works if $\rho < 1$ ($R \uparrow \implies D \uparrow\uparrow$)
- ▶ Increase size of government balance sheet
 - ▶ do so by issuing either bonds or reserves
 - ▶ only option if $\rho = 1$

Optimal amount of liquidity

- ▶ Steady-state:
 - ▶ utility benefit vs distortionary taxation
 - ▶ liquidity demand not satiated
- ▶ ZLB:
 - ▶ deviate from optimal liquidity-tax tradeoff
 - ▶ $q \uparrow \rightarrow i^B \downarrow \rightarrow y_t, \pi_t$ fall less for given expected future inflation
- ▶ Loss function:

$$\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[(y_t - y^*)^2 + \mu (q_t - q^*)^2 + \frac{\theta}{\kappa} (\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 \right]$$


Optimal reserve policy

- ▶ Rich dynamics
 - ▶ timing of reserve accumulation matters
 - ▶ and depends on weight on inflation vs output
- ▶ What's the benchmark?
 - ▶ always have active liquidity or tax management
 - ▶ what about second-best with constant liquidity and taxes?
- ▶ Assumptions about tax instruments matter


Tax instruments

- ▶ Only output tax, no wage subsidy
 - ▶ creates inflation
 - ▶ lowers real wage \rightarrow labor supply
- ▶ Important restriction:
 - ▶ rules out ZLB stabilization with tax policy (Correia et al.)
 - ▶ shapes optimal tax and reserve path

CB cares about inflation



CB cares about output



Liquidity: costs and benefits

- ▶ Gov't debt $\uparrow \implies$ transfer resources to constrained agents \implies output \uparrow
 - ▶ low-MPC savers to high-MPC borrowers
 - ▶ unproductive savers to productive entrepreneurs
- ▶ Focus on gov't bond purchases
 - ▶ but CB can buy private assets directly
 - ▶ with no need to raise distortionary taxes
- ▶ What if balance sheet expansion financed by foreign?
- ▶ Financial market reaction, communication (“taper tantrum”)

Conclusion

- ▶ Workhorse model of reserve management
 - ▶ reserve policy \longleftrightarrow spreads \longleftrightarrow gov't budget
- ▶ Normative analysis
 - ▶ great baseline
 - ▶ reserves vs tax instruments
 - ▶ allocative role of liquidity, CB portfolio
 - ▶ interaction with financial markets