On the effectiveness of loan-to-value regulation in a multiconstraint framework

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The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy or of the Eurosystem.

THE PAPER IN A NUTSHELL

- Provides micro-data evidence from Sweden of:
 - slackness (or lack thereof) of LTV and DSTI constraints,
 - partition of constrained borrowers between classes: LTV-only, DSTI-only, LTV & DSTI.

Crucial claim:

with DSTI constraints, lower LTV limit may not imply lower debt-to-GDP ratio (and may even increase house prices).

- Model-based assessment:
 - simple and full model with long-term debt (calibrated to Sweden);
 - steady-state comparison with different levels of constraints;
 - deterministic simulations with occasionally binding constraints.

THE PAPER IN A NUTSHELL

- ▶ Interesting topic.
- Intriguing micro evidence.
- A step in the right direction in terms of assessment method.

FOUR COMMENTS

- 1. Effectiveness, global solutions, and policy objectives.
- 2. Empirics and inframarginal effects of changes in DSTI.
- 3. Modelling endogenous heterogeneity.
- **4.** Quantitative discipline with the Swedish case.

SIMULATIONS: GAUGING POLICY EFFECTIVENESS

- ▶ How to compare relative size of different shocks? Is 5% change in max LTV the same as 5% change in DSTI?
- Given asymmetric responses to shocks, key aspect is to assess macroprud policy effectiveness in response to different shocks.
 - \longrightarrow Do conclusions follow through if macroprud instruments are activated in response to shocks and not from SS?
- ► Effectiveness of macroprud rules (and related indeterminacies) rather than discretionary policies.

GLOBAL SOLUTIONS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES

- To really assess macroprud effectiveness, need for occasionally binding constraints globally (and not just locally).
- Global solution may inform better about state-dependence (asymmetry) of responses to policy.
- Plus (and especially): Treat effects of uncertainty properly, with precautionary motives.
- Characterize key tension between macroprud objectives:
 - active dynamic stabilization or
 - creation of buffers to reduce financial vulnerability.

TAKING EMPIRICS ONE STEP FURTHER

- Shape of the histograms and degree of bindingness of constraints (and of precautionary behavior?).
- Key empirical challenge: How much of the higher effectiveness of the DSTI limit (found in other studies, too) happens at the limit and how much is inframarginal?
- (Distribution of LTVs: heads vs. amounts.)
- (KALP vs. DSTI and transfers, interaction with fiscal policy.)
- (LTVs with only collateralized debt in model.)




Figure 1: Distributions of constraints for new borrowers in Sweden, 2011-2015

MODELLING ENDOGENOUS HETEROGENEITY

- ▶ Data: Household heterogeneity in debt, wealth, income.
- Partition of households in four classes is reminiscent of:
 - savers.
 - standard borrowers (LTV-only),
 - poor hand-to-month (LTV & DSTI),
 - wealthy hand-to-mouth (DSTI-only).
 - → HANK-style implications with heterogeneity in MPCs dominating intertemporal substitution effects?
- ► Endogenous distribution responds to policy (and history).

MODELLING CHOICES FOR SWEDEN

- ▶ LTV-dependent amortization requirement for mortgages (1% for LTV between 50% and 70%, 2% for LTV> 70%); perhaps even DTI-dependent (another 1% if debt > 4.5 I).
- ► (Role for FRMs vs ARMs, vintage structure of LT debt.)
- ► (Heterogeneous housing preferences quite consequential.)
- (In the 'Swedish economy,' LTV changes seem a good option: reduce indebtedness, contain house prices better, and even increase output.)